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	egente :			
	COMIE	The fo	ollowing is an index of the Minutes of the 20 March 1969 ecting:	66
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Secti	on IV (A	ction Items) cont.	
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Secti	on V (Sta	atus of Recent COMIREX Papers)	
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Page	24	Tab B - for 19 March 1969	25X1I
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	COMIREX-M-66 20 March 1969	
	Special Briefing	
	<del>*</del>	
	Status of Reconnaissance Coverage of North Vietnam	
	l. presented a comprehensive review and status report of reconnaissance coverage of North Vietnam since the 1 November 1968 bombing halt. He reported that his presentation had been prepared at the request of the Director, DIA, and was designed to provide a statistical and substantive overview of reconnaissance activities during the period 1 November 1968 through mid-March.	
	2. The briefing addressed the following subjects:	
	a. Current USIB and JCS requirements for North Vietnam, including an assessment of the objectives of such coverage.	
	b. A statistical report of the coverage acquired by satellite, drone, and SR-71 aircraft against the USIB search requirement.	
	c. A review of targets north of 190 N requiring weekly, twice monthly, and monthly coverage.	
	d. A review of coverage south of 19° N in the Panhandle Area with emphasis on logistic targets. This latter review included an assessment of tactical reconnaissance as well as drone and SR-71.	
	3. Major conclusions drawn from analysis are:	2
	a. Reconnaissance coverage of the North Vietnam Panhandle south of 19° N, while not being fully responsive to the frequencies specified by JCS/USIB, is considered adequate to monitor rehabilitation of the logistical net and to selectively sample traffic flow.	
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	b. JCS/USIB requirements for photo reconnaissance of North Vietnam north of 19° N are not being satisfied. While search coverage of remote areas every three weeks approaches fulfillment of the requirement, weekly search coverage of built-up areas and weekly coverage of selected priority targets fall far short of the specified requirements because of the adverse affects of weather on high altitude reconnaissance.  c. Weather poses the most difficult problem in the conduct of successful reconnaissance operations against North Vietnam. Based on extensive experience, we will almost certainly not be able to meet our requirements in all areas	25740
	for all periods of the year by high altitude reconnaissance alone.	25X1D
	e. Low level drone coverage provides a very high quality, but limited coverage capability, against priority targets in North Vietnam. Narrow swath and a limited area of terrain accessibility are the primary system limitations.	
	quality, but limited coverage capability, against priority targets in North Vietnam. Narrow swath and a limited area of terrain	
	quality, but limited coverage capability, against priority targets in North Vietnam. Narrow swath and a limited area of terrain accessibility are the primary system limitations.  f. The SR-71 provides the best capability for search coverage of North Vietnam. Weather, however, limits the capability of this system alone to satisfy our needs for coverage	
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25X1-	COMIREX-M-66 20 March 1969	25X1A
	4. At the conclusion of his presentation, reported that the Director, DIA, was interested in having COMIREX review the requirements for coverage of North Vietnam, the current status of their satisfaction, and the implications to certain currently stated USIB requirements. From this it was suggested that, if necessary, COMIREX could provide a status report with recommendations to USIB. It was agreed that the Office of the Chairman would conduct a review of North Vietnam requirements on behalf of the COMIREX and would provide suggestions as to revisions in the near future.	25X1A
	5. Selected graphics used by $\square$ are attached at Tab $C_{\bullet}$	25X1A
25X1	7	25X1A 25X1A
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			utes OMIREX-M-64		The following	<del></del>
		a. HATCH i b.	Page 7, p n the first line Page 19,	aragraph 2.edoes not require	the word capitalization.	
•		last line c. accept to	Page 23-	nstead of Annex first line at top	A. of pagechange	
	NRO 25X1	d. requirem	Page 24, nents to refinem	paragraph 20, l	ine 10change	2 <del>25</del> X1A
25X1A		2.  Report on Aircra	aft Activities	Far East		28 <b>5</b> XA
25X1A		FOOD FAIR mis	sions were flow orted GIANT SC	that no IDEALIS n in the 14-20 N ALE missions i	March period,	
	<u>Date</u> 19 Mar	Mission No. GS 122	Kep Afld,	rt, H <b>o</b> n Gai Port Kep RR Yd, Phuc ' Tri, RR Yd, Yen	Yen	
	20 Mar	GS 123		d, Xom Aplo, Amm R Yd, Lao Cai La		own
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4. During the period 14-20 March there were seven successful BUMPY ACTION missions; four were lost. The details, as provided by are summarized below.


DATE	MISSION NO.	AREAS/TARGETS	RESULTS
l4 Mar	Q523 (Low)	Nam Dinh TPP, Seg RR 4, Rhuly RR Yd, Bai Thuong Afld	MARS
14 Mar	Q511 (Low)	Kien An Afld, Cat Bi AFld	MARS
14 Mar	Q860(Low)	Cat Bi Afld, Haiphong Naval Fac.	LOST
15 Mar	Q515 (Low)	Hanoi Port Fac, Gia Lam Afld, SAM Site, 2023N 10623E	MARS
15 Mar	Q882 (Low)	Hanoi Complex	MARS
16 Mar	Q525 (Low)	SAM's 334, 331	MARS
16 Mar	Q887(Low)	Haiphong Nav. Base, Cat Bi Afld	MARS
17 Mar	Q881 (Low)	Nam Dinh Transp Pt, Nam Dinh TPP, Bac Mai Afld, Gia Lam Afld	LOST
18 Mar	Q516 (Low)	Rte 10, 1A & RR, Nam Dinh Transp Pt, Thanh Hoa Transp Pt	MARS
19 Mar	Q507 (Low)	Yen Vien RR Yd, Gia Lam Afld, Hanoi Port Fac., Bac Mai Afld	LOST
19 Mar	Q229 (High)	DMZ, Mu Gia Pass, Rte 15, Bai Thuong Afld	LOST

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25X1 25X1	COMIREX-M-66 20 March 1969	2 <del>3</del> \$**A
25X1A	5. reported overhead photographic missions designed to satisfy two major South China/North Vietnam requirements as follows:	
	a. Coverage of Lines of Communications (LOC) pertinent to the introduction of Chinese forces into North Vietnam (see COMOR-D-25/207, 4 March 1966). The number of LOC priority targets in North Vietnam and South China has been increased to 355. This increase resulted from the addition of targets in North Vietnam. Forty of these are military installations or spot targets and they have been added to Tab A.* The remainder of the targets are segments of transportation routes, rail, road, and water, which need to be watched. Because of the peculiar nature of these targets, they will not be included in Tab A but in the future this paragraph will contain a general comment on success in coverage and will note any intelligence of significance.  b. Coverage of North Vietnam to detect the possible introduction or deployment of offensive missile systems (see COMOR-D-25/200, 23 May 1967, and COMIREX-D-25.3/2, 20 November 1967) is shown on the grid map at Tab B for the period 6-12 March 1969. Four BUMPY ACTION missions flown during this time period and considered successful have not been reported. No SSM activity was observed.	
25X1A	Report on Aircraft ActivitiesCuba  6. reported GLASS LAMP coverage for the period 12-20 March as follows:	25X1
	*During this period, there is no surveillance coverage and no Tab A is attached to this particular report.	
25X1	11	25X1A
		25X1A
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25X1Å	TOP SECRET  Control Systemprenerical For Release 2003/04/23 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000800030006-6	25X1
25X1	COMIREX-M-66 20 March 1969	25X1A
	Section II (NPIC Report)	
	I. Using three experts in their respective fields, NPIC initiated a new type of report to COMIREX as a substitute for the reports on mission highlights which have been given during the past few months. The objective of the new reporting is to choose subjects of current interest and bring COMIREX up to date with pertinent photography or comments based on the analysis of recent photography. In this instance the subjects were the Sino-Soviet border, Launch Pad J at Tyuratam, and the SAWRFs.	25X1
25X1A 25X1A	a. In reporting on the Sino-Soviet border,  concentrated initially on Damansky Island.  He showed pictures of the terrain illustrating that while  it can be quite easily traversed from north to south it is  difficult to move either west or east.  showed inidications of general activity including preparing  field positions, deployed tanks, and other signs of this  general nature	25X1A 25X1A
25X1A	way. Finally, and with reference to the entire Sino-Soviet border, reported the present level of effort to study the extent and pattern of Soviet reconnaissance, both by helicopter and by conventional aircraft and including electronic reconnaissance as well as visual observation and photography.	
25X1	13	25X1A 25X1A
	Approved For Release 2003/04/23 : CIA-RDP79B01709A00080006-6  TOP SECRET Cantrol Systems Jointly	2 <b>5</b> 84A

25X1 35X1A	TOP SECRET  Control Systems rowerd For Release 2003/04/23 : CIA-RDP79B01709A009800030006-6	
25X1 <sup>.</sup>	COMIREX-M-66 20 March 1969	25X1A
25X1A	showed the most recent photography of the missile associated with Launch Pad J at Tyuratam. He displayed a good view of a portion of the vehicle in a horizontal position approximately two miles from its pad. In reply to a question surmised that the missile was first seen over one year ago in December 1969 and has been erected on the pad at least three times since that date.	25X1A
25X1A	c. noted that SAWRF #16 has been observed three nautical miles from Shanghai. This SAWRF is closer to a large city than any previously observed and is also unique in that it is virtually on the water at the mouth of the Yangtse River. This SAWRF was started in March 1966 but did not advance to the corridor stage until April 1968; mounding began November 1968. Photography clearly shows four large structures facing the coast. SAWRF #14, eight nautical miles from Tien Tsin, is unique in that it has the only one of the 300 trapezoidal structures associated with SAWRFs which has a parapet. In reply to a	
25X1A	question, advised that ten of the SAWRFs are rail served.  2. Following briefing, the Chairman asked members whether they felt that this new information might suggest abandoning U-2 coverage of Cheng Chou in favor of photographing Sites 14 and 15#16 is obviously too close to Shanghai. Members could see no really good reason for making such a switch.	25X1A
	14	25X1A
25X1		25X1A
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25X1 25X1		COMIREX-M-66 20 March 1969	25X1A
	Section III (Subcommittee and Working Group F	Reports)	NRO 25X1 25X1
			25X1A 25X1A
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25X1		COMIREX-M-66 20 March 1969	25X1A
		Section IV (Action Items)	
	·	Distribution Requirements for Airborne-Acquired Photography (COMIREX-D-34.6/1)	25X1
		l. The Executive Secretary noted that no member had requested that this distribution list be discussed at COMIREX. Some questions were asked by and were satisfactorily answered by The new distribution list was considered approved.	25X1A 25X1A
		Abstracts for Exploitation Products Data File (EPDF) (COMIREX-D-32.3/3)	25X1
		2. As the Chairman's question as to whether recommendations on abstracts for the EPDF were acceptable was met with no objection, the recommendations were considered approved.	25X1A
			25X1A
NRO 25X1			
		16	25X1A
25X1			25X1A
		Approved For Release 2003/04/23 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000800030006-6	2 <b>98</b> XA

TOP SECRET Control Systems Property For Release 2003/04/23 : CIA-RDP 9B01709A000800030006-6 25X1A COMIREX-M-66 20 March 1969 **NRO** 25X1 The DIA member wished to explore the problem of the inclusion of color further and asked specifically whether its inclusion had been the real reason for the malfunction on the 25X1A last CORONA. did not provide a direct answer but admitted that the decision to include color film just prior to launching a mission can present problems. He suggested that the most reasonable NRO antidote is to give NRO adequate lead time rather than to suggest the 25X1 inclusion of color on a short-fuse basis 17 25X1A 25X1 25X1A Approved For Release 2003/04/23 : CIA-RDP79B01709A00980003000 Handle Via 25<u>X</u>1A

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25X1.	COMIREX-M-66 20 March 1969	25X1A
25X1A 25X1A	Approval of Priorities for 1050 and Comments on Guidance Provided to NRO  6. The Chairman noted that the guidance provided by ICRS to NRO for Mission 1050 had raised some question as to the balance between area coverage and coverage of specific targets.  said that in his opinion if the problem is studied on a realistic basis a hundred or so targets designated for specific coverage should have very little impact on the general search mission.  suggested that no further issue be made of the targets for 1050 but recommended that he be permitted to present to COMIREX a briefing on how NRO uses guidance in the light of new software for CORONA missions. The DIA member advised that he was quite well aware of the problems, would not object to the paper in front of COMIREX for Mission 1050, but strongly supported a briefing in the near future.	2 <b>5</b> 8XA
25X1A	7. COMIREX approved the ICRS requirements for 1050.  agreed to brief COMIREX on CORONA guidance problems on 27 March.  Use of KH-4 in Support of Earth ResourcesMidwest Snow Coverage	
	8. The Chairman reported that Dr. Steininger had requested KH-4 support in photographing the unusually heavy snow cover in the midwest. The Department of Interior wishes to get an estimate of the extent and size of snow coverage to assist it in anticipating the possibility of floods. reported that there has been aircraft coverage including the use of This had provided good information on the area covered by snow but was not sufficiently conclusive on depth of the snow coverage.	285X1A 25X1A 25X1A
25X1		25X1A 25X1A
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5X1	COMIREX-M-66 20 March 1969	25X1A
5X1A 5X1A 5X1A	9. reported that the area is programmed for 1050 coverage. observed that taking into consideration the film capacity of 1050 he would not anticipate a real problem except perhaps in competition with low priority areas and perhaps mapping and charting coverage. After reported that an adequate sample would consume one percent of the film, or less, the Chairman suggested that when a good weather opportunity presented itself on the mission a minimum burst of stereo photography should be attempted. agreed with the recommendation while cautioning that COMIREX must use due caution in considering such demands so as not to become enmeshed in policy precedents which it might be awkward to reverse at some later date. The Chairman agreed to a cautious approach while advocating that in arriving at decisions as to the best use of CORONA, we recognize the present pressure to satisfy earth resources requirements and give due attention to	
5X1A 5X1A 5X1A	Support of Special Projects Office (Department of Interior) at  (COMIREX-D-15.8/4 and COMIREX-M-64, page 21)  10. The Chairman referred to discussion of support for  at the 27 February COMIREX meeting and reported that  had submitted new requirements. The revised requirements have been turned over to the Chairman, MCGWG, for review and referral to COMIREX.	25X1
5X1	19	25X1A
XI		25X1A
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25X1 25X1	COMIREX-M-66 20 March 1969	25X1A
	Section V (Status of Recent COMIREX Papers)	
25X1A	Planning Factors for the Exploitation of Reconnaissance Imagery:  National Reconnaissance Program, FY 1970-1974 (COMIREX-D-31.1/3)  1. The DIA member noted that he was in favor of the paper but requested some clarification of the last sentence of the first paragraph. The suggested change was agreed and will be reflected in the published version of the paper. The Chairman, EXSUBCOM, requested also that all references to the T-X-1 be deleted. The Chairman next addressed the question of classification and reported that he was hopeful that present discussions with would make it possible to release essential information to T-KH planners within the T-KH compartment.	25X1
25X1A	2. The Chairman suggested that Tabs A and B to the memorandum under discussion be studied in conjunction with Appendix N of the JIRG report, especially Annex N-l of this Appendix. reminded COMIREX of the need for those responsible for imagery exploitation to be advised of oncoming programs in order to prepare forecasts for personnel and equipment needs and recommended that in this context those responsible for exploitation carefully study Tab B to see if the information is adequate for their needs. The Chairman noted that by the same token EXSUBCOM should advise COMIREX when it notes significant changes which might have an impact on those responsible for exploitation. The Chairman concluded with the recommendation that the memorandum be approved in substance, pending resolution of the problem of classification, and he suggested that it be rescheduled for discussion in approximately a month so that COMIREX may be advised of the adequacy of the information provided by EXSUBCOM and how the information is being used.	
	20	25X1A
25X1		25X1A
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COMIREX-M-66
20 March 1969

Revision of FY 1969 Basic Requirements Tasked to DIA
(COMIREX-D-31, 4/24)

3. The DIA member informed COMIREX that the review conducted by DIA had reduced its basic production

3. The DIA member informed COMIREX that the review conducted by DIA had reduced its basic production responsibility and recommended COMIREX acceptance of the revision. COMIREX agreed with the proposed DIA changes.

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25X1 <sub>.</sub>	C OMIREX-M-66 20 Marcy 1969	25X1A
	Section VI (Other Business)	
25X1A 25X1A	Briefing on Color Presented to ICRS by  1.	25X1A 25X1 25X1A 25X1A 25X1A
25X1A	approximately one hour and fifteen minutes.  Visit of IRT to Houston	25X1
	2. The Chairman reported briefly on the visit of the IRT to Houston to view He mentioned the problems presented by the tracking of an unidentified object in space and expressed particular interest in getting an NPIC evaluation of the multi-sensor experiment.	25X1A
	evaluation of the multi-sensor experimentalso observed that the multi-sensor experiment had been the only aspect of the mission commented on adversely by the Soviets. The Soviets had referred to multi-sensor experimentation as being a form of espionage.	25X1A
	Editing of Cloud Cover from KH-4	25X1
	3. The Chairman, EXSUBCOM, referred to a request some time ago by the DIA member for EXSUBCOM to investigate the possibility of editing out cloud cover frames from KH-4 photography in order to reduce the amount of film reproduced and stored. EXSUBCOM has studied the problem at length and has determined that, for a variety of reasons, it would not be practicable or cost effective to edit out the cloud cover.	25X1A
	22	25X1A
25X1		25X1A
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"A View From Space"  4. At the request of a short section from an ABC television program of 9 February, sponsored by North American Rockwell, was shown to COMIREX. The section shown was a brief commentary by Mr. Jules Bergman addressed to the extent and efficacy of our satellite reconnaissance, It was the consensus of COMIREX that, while Mr. Bergman's remarks were provocative and unnecessary,  5. reported that, following the Executive Secretary's description of the entire show, a description confirmed by he would like to show the TV movie to some of those particularly interested in earth resources. undertook to arrange this.  Executive Secretary  Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation  Attachments  Tabs B & C	COMIREX-M-66	
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#### STATUS REPORT

## RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITIES NORTH VIETNAM

**NOVEMBER 1968 - MARCH 1969** 

This briefing is classified:

TOP SECRET

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#### REQUIREMENTS

- USIB-D-46.4/7 17 NOV 1967 "PHOTOGRAPHIC DETECTION OF OFFENSIVE MISSILE SYSTEMS IN NORTH VIETNAM"
- JCS 2150/267 8 MAY 1968 "AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE IN NVN AFTER FURTHER DE-ESCALATION AND/OR DURING COMPLETE CESSATION OF BOMBARDMENT (TS)"
- USIB-D-46.4/23 17 OCT 1968 "OVERHEAD IMAGERY RECONNAISSANCE OF NORTH VIETNAM DURING A TRUCE"

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#### **OBJECTIVES**

- REQUIREMENTS FOR AIRBORNE IMAGERY RECONNAISSANCE DIRECTED AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM ARE OPTIMIZED AGAINST THE FOLLOWING:
  - LOGISTICAL SUPPORT TO, AND BUILD-UP OF COMMUNIST FORCES THROUGHOUT NORTH VIETNAM
  - DEPLOYMENT OF INFILTRATION FORCES AND THE MOVEMENT OF SUPPLIES TOWARD SOUTH VIETNAM
  - INTRODUCTION INTO NORTH VIETNAM OF NEW OFFENSIVE WEAPONS OR OTHER ADVANCED SYSTEMS
  - THIRD PARTY INVOLVEMENT
  - COMPLIANCE WITH SPECIFIED PROVISIONS OF ANY TRUCE AGREEMENT

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
## SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

#### AREA COVERAGE

- 1. WEEKLY COVERAGE OF THE BUILT-UP AREAS
- 2. COVERAGE ONCE EVERY 3 WEEKS OF THE UNDER DEVELOPED AREAS

#### PRIORITY TARGETS

- 3. WEEKLY COVERAGE OF SELECTED HIGH PRIORITY TARGETS
- 4. TWICE MONTHLY COVERAGE OF SELECTED MILITARY AND LOGISTICS TARGETS
- 5. MONTHLY COVERAGE OF SELECTED AIR DEFENSE FACILITIES



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#### WEATHER

DIFFICULT PROBLEM IN THE ORDERLY ACQUISITION OF PHOTOGRAPHY OF NORTH VIETNAM. IT HAS A PARTICULARLY SERIOUS IMPACT UPON SATELLITE COVERAGE AND, TO A LESSER AND VARIED DEGREE, UPON MANNED AND DRONE RECONNAISSANCE COVERAGE AS WELL. THE MAJOR FACTOR LIMITING HIGH ALTITUDE PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE IS CLOUD COVER AT THE MIDDLE ALTITUDES. WHILE HIGH ALTITUDE RECONNAISSANCE OVER THE HANOI AREA, FOR EXAMPLE, IS POSSIBLE ONLY TWO DAYS IN JUNE. LOW ALTITUDE RECONNAISSANCE IS POSSIBLE ON 20 DAYS IN JUNE. SIMILAR ANOMALIES BETWEEN HIGH AND LOW ALTITUDE CLOUD PATTERNS ARE FOUND FOR THE PANHANDLE AREA AND THE NORTHWEST MOUNTAINOUS REGION.

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## AVERAGE NUMBER OF DAYS EACH MONTH SUITABLE FOR HIGH AND LOW ALTITUDE PHOTOGRAPHY\*

#### JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC 3.0 5.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 LAO KAY HIGH 4.0 4.0 7.0 10.0 6.0 3.0 2.0 (NW MTNS) LOW 6.0 5.0 9.0 11.0 12.0 9.0 9.0 14.0 14.0 18.0 12.0 13.0 HANOI HIGH 5.3 3.5 2.0 1.9 1.8 4.0 9.1 5.9 9.7 3.8 3.6 2.8 LOW 9.7 15.1 20.1 21.3 18.7 19.5 20.5 15.5 15.2 8.5 4.7 DONG HOI 5.0 6.0 7.0 10.0 5.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 HIGH 4.0 7.0 7.0 5.0 LOW 8.0 8.0 11.0 17.0 20.0 20.0 21.0 19.0 14.0 15.0 11.0 10.0 VINH HIGH 4.0 3.0 4.0 7.0 6.0 3.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 3.0 2.0 5.0 LOW 4.0 11.0 18.0 17.0 16.0 15.0 6.0 8.0 8.0 9.0 6.0 13.0

<sup>\*</sup>LOW ALTITUDE: LESS THAN 3/10 CLOUD COVER AT 3,000 FEET

<sup>\*</sup>HIGH ALTITUDE: LESS THAN 3/10 OVERALL CLOUD COVER

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## USIB VIEW ON WEATHER PROBLEM

A COMPARISON OF USIB REQUIREMENTS WITH THE EXPECTED DAYS OF SUITABLE WEATHER FOR RECONNAISSANCE OVER NORTH VIETNAM INDICATES THAT WE WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY NOT BE ABLE TO MEET THEM IN ALL AREAS FOR ALL PERIODS OF THE YEAR BY HIGH ALTITUDE RECONNAISSANCE ALONE. DURING PERIODS OF WORST CLIMATOLOGY, THEREFORE, WE SHOULD RETAIN THE CAPABILITY TO CONDUCT RECONNAISSANCE BELOW CLOUD LEVEL OR BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE WEATHER DEGRADATION TO THE ADEQUACY OF OUR IMAGERY RECONNAISSANCE

#### **SECRET**

# SATISFACTION OF RECONNAISSANCE REQUIREMENTS

SOUTH OF 19°N.

#### SECRET

## COVERAGE OF AIRFIELDS 1 NOV-28 FEB

WEEKLY (17)	TIMES COVERED	LAST USABLE COVERAGE
HANOI GIA LAM	3	28 FEB 69
KEP	1	11 DEC 68*
PHUC YEN	2	4 FEB 69
	AVG-2	
BI-WEEKLY (8)		
BAI THUONG	4	19 FEB 69
HAIPHONG CAT BI	6	24 FEB 69
DONG SUONG	5	15 FEB 69
HAIPHONG KIEN AN	7	25 JAN 69
YEN BAI	4	27 JAN 69
	AVG-5.2	27 JAN 07
MONTHLY (4)		
DIEN BIEN PHU	4	14 FEB 69*
DONG HOI	18	10 FEB 69
HOA LAC	4	15 FEB 69
LANG SON	2	28 JAN 69
VINH	6	
	A V G - 6.8	19 FEB 69

\*COVERED SINCE MARCH 1

#### **SECRET**

#### HAIPHONG PORT

#### REQUIREMENT -

COVERAGE ONCE WEEKLY

#### STATUS -

 TOTAL AND PARTIAL COVERAGE ACQUIRED ABOUT 20 TIMES SINCE 1 NOV 68.
 HOWEVER, TARGET COMPLETELY COVERED WITH HIGH QUALITY, CLOUD FREE PHOTOGRAPHY ONLY FIVE TIMES DURING THIS PERIOD.

#### SECRET

#### SAM SITES

#### REQUIREMENT -

• COVERAGE ONCE MONTHLY OF 185 ACTIVE SITES

#### STATUS -

 REQUIREMENT SATISFIED IN HANOI-HAIPHONG AREA. CURRENT RECONN-AISSANCE EFFORT DIRECTED TOWARD ACQUISITION OF VHR COVERAGE OF MODIFIED FAN SONG RADARS.

#### SECRET

## ELECTRIC POWER FACILITIES

- REQUIREMENT COVERAGE ONCE MONTHLY OF 16 INSTALLATIONS (DAMAGED OR UNDER CONSTRUCTION).
- STATUS IN MOST INSTANCES, THESE INSTALLATIONS PHOTOGRAPHED ADEQUATELY ONLY ONCE SINCE 1 NOV 68.

#### **SECRET**

## RAIL INSTALLATIONS


- REQUIREMENT COVERAGE ONCE WEEKLY
- STATUS GS MISSIONS IN JAN 69 PROVIDED THE ONLY COMPREHENSIVE COVERAGE OF RAIL NET SINCE 1 NOV 68.
  LIMITED DRONE COVERAGE ACQUIRED OF SELECTED SEGMENTS.

#### **SECRET**

## SATISFACTION OF RECONNAISSANCE REQUIREMENTS

NORTH OF 19°N.

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SECRET

## LOGISTIC ACTIVITY

1 NOV-28 FEB

PHASE I (NOV)

INITIAL HEAVY SURGE OF SUPPLIES SOUTHWARD PRIMARY EMPHASIS ON, ESTABLISHED LOGISTIC NET, EXCEPT FOR COASTAL SHIPMENTS

PHASE II (NOV-FEB)

CONTINUED HEAVY FLOW OF SUPPLIES SOUTHWARD— RESTRUCTURING AND REHABILITATION OF LOGISTIC NET WITH CONSTRUCTION OF NEW TRANSSHIPMENT POINTS AND EMPHASIS ON RAIL AND WATER TRANSPORTATION

PHASE III (FEB)

INDICATIONS OF STABILIZATION OF SUPPLY FLOW AND CONTINUED LONGER TERM IMPROVEMENTS OF LOGISTIC NET